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TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATIONS.  
KIOBEL’S TOUCH AND CONCERN: A TEST UNDER CONSTRUCTION* 
 
Ph.D. Maria Chiara Marullo 
Ph.D. Francisco Javier Zamora Cabot 
 
We have conceived this study to support the work of the teams responsible for 
developing some International Reports within the European project: Business & Human 
Rights challenges for cross border litigation in the European Union. Action Grant of 
the EU. More Information at: http://humanrightsinbusiness.eu/. At the same time, we 
think that this paper may be of interest in the study and monitoring of transnational 
litigation for Human Rights violations+ . 
 
Abstract: In recent years the international debate on Transnational Human Rights 
Litigation has mainly focused, although not exclusively, on the role of the Alien Tort 
Claims Act as a way of redress for serious Human Rights violations. This Act has given 
the possibility of granting a restorative response to victims, in a Country, such as the 
United States of America, that assumes the defense of an interest of the International 
Community as a whole: to guarantee the access to justice to the aforesaid victims. The 
purpose of this article is to analyze the recent and restrictive position on this Act of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, in the Kiobel case, and especially when, as a 
means of modulating the limitative doctrine affirmed there, the Touch and Concern test 
was introduced. It has generated from its very inception a strong discussion amongst 
international legal scholars and also great repercussions concerning the practice of the 
U.S. District and Circuit Courts. 
 
 
Summary: I. Introduction. II. A brief overview of the Alien Tort Claims Act. III. 
The imbroglio of Kiobel. IV. Federal Court’s Debates about the Test. V. Post-Kiobel 
Consequences. 1.-The future application of the ATCA ratione personae. 2.- 
Implications for the TVPA. 3.- On the creation of a Universal Jurisdiction Norm in civil 
matters. 4.- Consequences in other areas. VI. Final Reflections. Table. 
 
                                                 
+ We dedicate this work to the memory of Antonio Mosé Proietto Donato and Professor Alfred E. Von 
Overbeck. 
* This work has been developed within the framework of the Action “Redes de Excelencia”- El Tiempo 
de los Derechos, DER2014-53503-REDT and the EU Action Grant “Business and Human Rights 
Challenges for Cross-Border Litigation in the EU”, 2014-2016. The authors gratefully acknowledge 
Professor Nicolás Zambrana-Tévar, for invaluable help related to this study. 
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I. Introduction 
According to a study published a few years ago by three Swiss researchers1 about more 
than 40,000 multinational companies and cross-shareholdings, that has had a significant 
impact on international debates, it can be deduced that something less than 150 of those 
multinational companies have absolute control or significant stakes in half the total 
number of the multinational companies analyzed. In other words, major multinational 
companies are super-connected and have control over a substantial percentage of the 
remaining companies: “The top holders within the core can thus be thought of as an 
economic “super-entity” in the global network of corporations”2. 
The resulting accumulation of power is very noticeable. It has traditionally been in 
sectors related to energy, especially the extraction of gas and oil, with companies whose 
managements have marked and still mark our time and even in strategic areas also for 
human survival, such as water and food3 this leads us to rethink what might be the 
consequences in terms of the global economy, financial markets and the implications 
that the advanced accumulation may have in the field of protection of Human Rights4.  
Besides, there are other reasons to be concerned.  For example, no one doubts about the 
impact of these companies on national governments and international organizations. 
Regarding their influence on the decisions of national governments, it is known the 
existence of the phenomenon of "revolving doors" between the executive, the industry 
and the financial sector5. Cases like that are very common in all latitudes and can have 
major impacts on the protection of Human Rights worldwide. 
Propelled by the ideological ascendency of neo-liberalism, TNCs dominate 
virtually the entire international legal order, influencing key international 
institutions and gaining inordinate structural control. It is well known that 
                                                 
1 Vitali S, Glattfelder JB, Battiston S (2011) The Network of Global Corporate Control. PLoS ONE 6(10): 
e25995. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025995. 
2 Ibidem p.6 
3 On this point see Francisco Javier Zamora Cabot and María Victoria Camarero Suarez, 2016: “En torno 
al derecho humano al agua y el saneamiento en la Carta Encíclica Laudato Si’ del Santo Padre 
Francisco”,  Revista de Derecho, Agua y Sostenibilidad - REDAS - ISSN 2444-9571 § V.2 – pg. Núm. 0, 
2016, in: http://redas.webs.uvigo.es.   
4 On this issue it is important the contribution of  Jernej Letnar Černič, “Obligaciones de las empresas en 
el marco del Derecho Humano al medio ambiente sano y al agua”, in Francisco Javier Zamora Cabot, 
Jesús García Cívico and Lorena Sales Pallares (eds.), 2013, Universidad de Alcalá, Servicio de 
Publicaciones, La responsabilidad de las multinacionales por violaciones de derechos humanos. In this 
article the author argues that corporations have a responsibility in the exercise of the human right to water 
and the environment, which can be derived from international and national laws. At the same time the 
author analyzes the consequences of the violations committed by multinational corporations, by no 
respecting and protecting this right. 
5 The phenomenon of "revolving door" implies an interconnection between the roles of legislator, the 
executive and the private sector affected by the national and international legislation and in some cases 
this connection is based on the granting of reciprocated privileges.  
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the power of some TNCs has, for some time, exceeded the power of many 
states [...] then, exercise immense influence over the material, economic and 
political lives of millions of human beings, and over the life chances of 
other species and ecosystems generally6. 
 
Those circumstances make it almost impossible to hold those entities accountable for 
their acts. This raises, among others, a peculiar paradox, the same companies that claim, 
and get all kinds of rights, for example regarding the financing of their projects and the 
solution of their differences with host States with respect to investments7, refuse to 
respond in some way to the mandates of International Law, or incorporate in their 
obligations the respect of Human Rights in their activities, including those related to the 
protection of the environment. 
In the situation described, multinational companies are shaping a world made for their 
exclusive benefit, where they have an immense capacity to influence governmental 
policies, enjoy an enviable status, have legal rights, are protected by a potent financial 
apparatus that allows them to plan and carry out their projects, respecting only the few 
obligations on Human Rights that they are willing to take.  
Multinational corporations have succeeded in imposing an international 
legal system that is heavily weighted in their favor. International law 
respects domestic law definitions of the corporate structure, which permit 
international enterprises to incorporate multiple legally separate entities that, 
as a general rule, are not considered to be responsible for each other’s debts 
and obligations, including compensation for the injuries they inflict8. 
 
Besides, we can add that legal and procedural barriers, in the territory of the State in 
which the Human Rights violations were committed, make these conducts go 
unpunished. This problem is also present when cases have been carried out by 
International Courts in determining the criminal responsibility of those involved in 
unlawful acts. Spatial and temporal limitations, and the necessary cooperation with the 
States in whose territory the facts are verified, are just some of the boundaries that tie 
the hands of international bodies in the defense of Human Rights and the punishment of 
atrocities. 
                                                 
6 Anna Grear and Burns H. Weston, “The Betrayal of Human Rights and the Urgency of Universal 
Corporate Accountability: Reflections on a Post-Kiobel Lawscape”, Human Rights Law Review, 2015, 
15, 21–44, p.25, in: http://hrlr.oxfordjournals.org. 
7 About f the potential conflict between the protections that these agreements afford to corporations and 
the rights of natural persons, see Marc Jacob, “International Investment Agreements and Human Rights”, 
Inst. Dev. & Peace Research Paper Series, 2010, pp. 26–31 in: http://www.humanrights 
business.org/files/I nternational_investment_agreements_and_human rights.pdf. 
8 Beth Stephens, “Extraterritoriality and Human Rights after Kiobel”, 28 Md. J. Int'l L. 256 (2013).  
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol28/iss1/13. 
4 
 
The situation is further complicated if the barriers mentioned above add a new variant. 
The violations may have been committed in whole or in part with the complicity of 
authorities, by multinational companies9. What is the regime of responsibility of 
multinational corporations for serious violations of international law and Human 
Rights? The responsibility of multinational companies, at national and international 
levels, now generates increased interest and remains an important issue in the 
international debate as demonstrated by the many doctrinal works in this area10. 
                                                 
9 The issue of legal and procedural barriers has been widely discussed in a recent study published by 
ICAR, CORE, ECCJ. This study was conducted by Professor Gwynne Skinner, Robert McCorquodale 
and Olivier De Schutter and refers to the analysis of the Third Pillar and access to judicial remedies. 
There It has been shown that the currently existing barriers prevent, all or in part, of the access to justice 
for victims of serious violations of international law perpetrated by multinational companies. The text of 
the document is available at: http://accountabilityroundtable.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/El-Tercer-
Pilar.pdf. 
10 Among the recent doctrine see: Duncan French & Tim Stephens, ILA Study Group on Due Diligence in 
International Law—First Report, International Law Association, March 7, 2014 http://www.ilahq. 
org/en/committees/study_groups.cfm/cid/1045. James G. Stewart, “The Turn to Corporate Criminal 
Liability for International Crimes: Transcending the Alien Tort Statute”, 47 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 
121,-179 (2014). Among the existing broad doctrine about this issue, see: J. L. Cernic, “Regulating 
Corporations under International Law”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 8, 2010, pp. 725-
743; P. Hunn, Blaming the Parents: The Marginalisation of Corporate Liability for Transnational Human 
Rights Violations in Developing States, L. B. Dissertation, U. of Southampton, 2010; C. González Posso, 
La Responsabilidad Empresarial y los Derechos Humanos, Indepaz, Bogotá, 2009; A. Gatto, 
Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights, Elgar, Cheltenham, 2011 ; C. de la Vega et alii, Holding 
Businesses Accountable For Human Rights Violations, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Dialogue on 
Globalization, July, 2011 ; P. Simons, “International Law’s Invisible Hand and the Future of Corporate 
Accountability for Violations of Human Rights”, en Journal of Human Rights and the Environment, 2012 
(3), 51 pp. (en prensa) ; C. Van Dam, “Tort Law and Human Rights: Brothers in Arms on the Role of Tort 
Law in the  Area of Business and Human Rights”, Journal of European Tort Law, vol. 2, 2011, pp. 221-
254; E. De Brabandere, “Human Rights and Transnational Corporations. The Limits of Direct Corporate 
Responsibility”, Human Rights and International Legal Discourse, vol. 4, 2010, pp. 66-88 e Idem, “Non-
State Actors and Human Rights. Corporate Responsibility and the Attempts to Formalize the Role of 
Corporations as Participants in the International Legal System”, en Participants in the International Legal 
System, Multiple Perspectives on Non-State Actors in International Law, J. d’Aspremont (ed.), Routledge, 
Abingdon, 2011, pp. 268-283.See also, I. Daugareilh, “Responsabilidad social de las empresas 
transnacionales: análisis crítico y prospectiva jurídica”, Cuadernos de Relaciones Laborales, vol. 27, 
2009, pp. 77-106; A. Campos Serrano, “Derechos Humanos y empresas: un enfoque radical”, Relaciones 
Internacionales, 2011, pp. 41-65, With a strong criticism of the international institutional framework, see 
also,  J.M.Woods, “The Evolution of Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Abuses: A Human 
Rights Framework for Corporate Accountability”, ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law, 
vol. 17, 2011, pp. 321-334. About the specific issue of Business and Human Rights violations: A. Cortina 
Orts, Empresa y Derechos Humanos, Discurso a la Real Academia de Ciencias Morales y Políticas, 8-XI-
2011, 21 pp. ; B. Sjafjel, Regulating Companies as if the World Matters:Reflections from the Ongoing 
Sustainable Companies Project, en http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm? abstract _id=1964213 ; S-D 
Bachmann, “Terrorism Litigation as Deterrence Under International Law- From Protecting Human Rights 
to Countering Hybrid Threats”, Amicus Curiae, Issue 87, 2011 ; J. Konov, Piercing the Veil’s Effect on 
Corporate Human Rights Violations & International Corporate Crime (Human Trafficking, Slavery, etc), 
en http://mpra. ub. uni-muenchen.de/35714/1/Piercing _the_Veils _Effect_Joshua_Konov_2011.pdf; S. 
Deva, Regulating Corporate Human Rights Corporations-Humanizing Business, Routledge, Abingdon, 
2012 ; B. L. Mangalpady, Relationship Between Business Corporations’ And Human Rights: A Legal 
Analysis, en http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm? abstra ct_id=1987032 y M. Pentikäinen, “Changing 
International ‘Subjectivity’ and Rights and Obligations under International Law-Status of Corporations”, 
Utrecht Law Review, vol. 8, 2012, pp. 145-154.  
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Anyway, as advanced by Pigrau Solé11: It is a common principle to all legal systems 
that operators must respond for any damages caused to third parties. But in the case of 
international system, it is almost impossible that the multinational corporations are 
directly responsible for violations of international legal rules, since the mediation of 
States has made those entities legally invisible. 
For all these reasons, we must be aware that this phenomenon exists and we must find 
the way to implement existing mechanisms to redress those violations or create 
international and national instruments that can contribute to this purpose. The 
International Community has to seize this opportunity to eliminate all existing legal and 
procedural barriers at the national and international level and, in the same way, to 
formulate concrete measures, strategies and actions, starting from the existing 
international legal system or national systems, to make access to justice effective at all 
levels. In particular, we need to create the conditions to guarantee an appropriate forum 
to determine all the responsibilities of the actors involved in serious violations of 
Human Rights, even in the case of multinational corporations, and finally to guarantee 
an adequate compensation to victims for the damages suffered12. 
When a company takes your land without compensation, pollutes your 
water, or brings in private militia to guard an oil well who start to rape and 
abuse the women of a local community, you should have the right to ensure 
it stops, and to get your livelihood restored.  It should not matter whether 
you are rich or poor or in what country you live.  Yet many victims of 
business-related human rights abuse have no access to judicial remedy in 
                                                                                                                                               
2 Vid., v. gr., M. Requejo Isidro, Violaciones Graves de Derechos Humanos y Responsabilidad Civil-
Transnational Human Rights Claims, Thomson/Aranzadi, Pamplona, 2009; Idem, “Litigación Civil 
Internacional por Abusos Contra Derechos Humanos. El Problema de la Competencia Judicial 
Internacional”, Anuario Español de Derecho internacional Privado, Idem, “La Responsabilidad de las 
Empresas por Violación de Derechos Humanos: Deficiencias del Marco Legal, Scientia Juris vol. 1, 
2011; R. Meeran, Demandas por Agravios Contra Multinacionales por Violación de los Derechos 
Humanos. Perspectiva General de la Situación Fuera de Estados Unidos, en http://www.business-
humanrights.org/media/documents/richard-meeran-demandas-contra-mncs-7-mar-2011.pdfhttp ; F. 
Gregor, Principles and Pathways: Legal Opportunities to Improve Europe’s Corporate Accountability 
Framework, ECCJ, November, 2010 y D. Augenstein, et alii, Study on the Legal Framework for Human 
Rights and the Environment Applicable to EU Companies Operating Outside the European Union, 
University of Edimburg, 2010 ; I. L. A., Interim Report, Private International Law Aspects of Civil 
Litigation for Human Rights Violations, Committee on International Civil Litigation and the Interests of 
the Public, Report of the Hague Conference, 2010, London, pp. 564-594 ; J.G. Dale, Free Burma: 
Transnational Legal Action and Corporate Accountability, U. of Minnesota Press, 2011, D. Weiss y R. 
Shamir, “Corporate Accountability to Human Rights: The Case of the Gaza Strip”, Harvard Human 
Rights Journal, vol. 24, 2011, pp. 155-183.  
11 Antoni Pigrau Solé  “La responsabilidad civil de las empresas transnacionales a través de la alien tort 
claims act por su participación en violaciones de derechos humanos”, Revista española de desarrollo y 
cooperación, No 25, Madrid, 2010, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 113-130, p.114. 
12 On this point Marullo, Maria Chiara, “Access to Justice and Forum Necessitatis in Transnational 
Human Rights Litigation”, January 11, 2016, Papeles el Tiempo de los Derechos, HURI-AGE, 
Consolider-Ingenio 2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=271374. 
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their home country. […]The majority of cases of abuse we see at Business 
& Human Rights Resource Centre occur in weak governance zones, which 
often do not have an independent judiciary, and sometimes lack fully 
functioning courts at all.  Therefore these victims frequently do not have 
access to enforceable remedies in their home country.  Some then seek legal 
remedy elsewhere, e.g., where the company is headquartered13.   
 
In recent years the international debate has focused on the role of the Alien Tort Claims 
Act (hereinafter ATS or ATCA) as a means of redress for serious Human Rights 
violations. This mechanism has been used as one of the possible alternatives, as a useful 
response to repress, prevent and repair those conducts. In other words, this Act has 
given the possibility to grant a restorative response to victims, in a State which is not 
linked directly to the conduct, but responds to an interest of the International 
Community as a whole: the protection of Human Rights. Nevertheless, this system 
described above must be considered in light of a recent decision of the U.S. Supreme 
Court in the cases Kiobel14 and Daimler15, which represents a setback in the defense of 
Human Rights and reparation for victims.  
In particular, the object of this article is to analyze the test created by the Supreme Court 
of the United States in Kiobel, the “Touch and Concern Test” and the post Kiobel 
jurisprudence of the District Courts and the different Circuits on this field in the last 
three years.  It is important to say that this Test is under construction and that many of 
the problems referred to in this article, related to its application, may be resolved by 
another ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States in the next years. For the time 
being, this Court has decided to allow Federal Courts to continue working and assessing 
a safe path that will define the future of the ATCA and its applicability in cases on 
international violations perpetrated by individuals and companies outside the United 
                                                 
13 Sif Thorgeirsson, Manager, Corporate Legal Accountability Project, Business & Human Rights 
Resource Centre, Closing the courtroom door: Where can victims of human rights abuse by business find 
justice? 5/12/2014. Available at: http://business-humanrights.org/en/closing-the-courtroom-door-where-
can-victims-of-human-rights-abuse-by-business-find-justice.  
14 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, Supreme Court of the United States 569 U.S No. 10-1491. 
(Decided April 17, 2013). In this case, the plaintiffs alleged violations of international law under the ATS 
of some corporations: Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Shell Transport and Trading Company, P.L.C. and 
Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, aiding and abetting the Nigerian government in 
killing, raping, torturing, and otherwise abusing residents of Nigeria’s Ogoniland, a region near the Niger 
Delta. 
15 Daimler AG v. Bauman et al, Supreme Court of the United States No. 11-965. (Decided January 14, 
2014). In this case In 2004, twenty people, residents in Argentina have sued the corporation Daimler-
Chrysler AG before U.S. Federal Court, claimed that Mercedes-Benz Argentina, a subsidiary of former, 
had collaborated with security forces of that country during the "Guerra Sucia" (1976-1983) in the 
detention, torture, disappearance and death of employees of the company placed in Gonzalez Catan. 
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States, which have a relevant connection with the United States, sufficient to displace 
the presumption of extraterritoriality established in Kiobel. 
In order to analyze the touch and concern test in Kiobel, it is essential, following these 
preliminary observations, to introduce in Section II a brief history of the Alien Tort 
Claims Act, and in Section III the “imbroglio” in Kiobel, on the interpretation of 
extraterritoriality; while Section IV is focused on the actual debates about this test 
before Federal Courts, Section V emphasizes the critical consequences of the actual 
interpretation of the concept of extraterritoriality and in Section VI some final 
reflections are presented. 
 
II. A brief overview of the Alien Tort Claims Act 
The American Federal System consists of 13 Circuits, which are formed by District 
Courts and Courts of Appeal. As it is explained in our previews works16, contrary to the 
State Courts, Federal Courts have limited jurisdiction, but, instead it is exclusive and 
original over large areas of the US legal system. Due to its limited jurisdiction, the 
system requires a specific assignment through a constitutional mandate and other 
specifics given by the legislator, in the framework of the Jurisdiction to Adjudicate17, 
an issue still being debated by legal scholars18. We rely on the Restatement (Third) of 
the Foreign Relations Law, in which the different forms of jurisdiction are described, 
such as adjudicative jurisdiction, prescriptive jurisdiction and executive jurisdiction. 
Thus, the Federal Courts are competent to settle cases on serious violations of Human 
Rights by reference to a constitutional provision, or by a Congress’ mandate, as it did, 
for example, in the recent Torture Victims Protection Act19 (hereinafter TVPA) and in 
                                                 
16 Zamora Cabot, Francisco Javier, “Los Derechos Fundamentales en Clave del Alien Tort Claims Act of 
1789 de los EE.UU. y su Aplicación a las Corporaciones Multinacionales: The ATCA Revisited”, Cursos 
de Derecho Internacional y Relaciones Internacionales de Vitoria-Gasteiz, 2006, p. 349. 
17 On this point, Colangelo, talking about the specific form of jurisdiction using in the courts language on 
ATS litigation: the subject-matter jurisdiction, affirmed that this type of jurisdiction is inserted in the area 
of adjudicative jurisdiction. Colangelo, Post-Kiobel procedure: subject matter jurisdiction or prescriptive 
jurisdiction? UCLA Journal of International Law & Foreign Affairs, 2015, University of California. 
18 On this point the international doctrine debates whether the applicable international law rules in case of 
the ATS are those governing a state’s jurisdiction to prescribe, to adjudicate, or to enforce by judicial 
means (or some combination thereof). On this topic, see e.g. the articles of Professor, Zamora Cabot, 
Francisco Javier, “Una luz en el corazón de las tinieblas: el Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789 (ATCA) de los 
EEUU”, en Soberanía del Estado y Derecho Internacional, Homenaje al Profesor J.A. Carrillo Salcedo, 
Tomo II., 2005 Universidad de Sevilla, Sevilla; Zamora Cabot, Francisco Javier, “Casos recientes de 
aplicación del Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) of 1789, de los EEUU, respecto de las corporaciones 
multinacionales”, en Pacis Artes. obra homenaje al Profesor Julio D. Gonzalez Campos, Tomo II, 2005, 
Derecho internacional privado, derecho constitucional y varia, Eurolex Editorial, Madrid 
19 Codified in section 1350 volume 28 of the United States Code. The Torture Victim Protection Act 
1992, which would create an alternative forum, in many cases necessitatis, for victims of Torture crimes. 
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the ATCA; “(t)he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an 
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States”20. 
 
The concept underlined by this act is simple: there is nothing unusual in the fact that a 
court can hear civil claims on a special tort, including serious Human Rights violations 
that occurred outside its territorial jurisdiction. It is a reservation of jurisdiction of U.S. 
Federal Courts, based on the law of nations, international treaties and on a reduced 
number of conducts contrary to jus cogens. In order words, this Act empowers the 
District Courts to hear cases in which a foreigner claims for violations of the law of 
nations and international treaties to which the United States is a party21. Since the 
famous case Filártiga22 in 1980, the doors for the victims of one of these international 
illicit acts where opened; they have been able to file civil lawsuits against individuals 
and companies involved in such acts before federal courts. The ATCA has provided a 
forum necessitatis23 for victims of such acts, from a civil perspective, in the case of 
international torts committed by individuals or multinational companies. 
 
Since 1980 the Federal Courts have faced many issues concerning the nature of this act 
and its compatibility with other national and international rules granting immunities, 
amnesties and many other matters related to the scope of applicability of this type of 
jurisdiction. The first challenge that federal courts have had to overcome has been the 
                                                                                                                                               
This Act authorizes any individual to bring civil claim to an US court for committing acts of torture or 
extrajudicial executions, provided that the case has not had a solution in place of commission of such 
actions. As explained by Koebele, the underlying idea behind this rule is clear, with its creation: “It 
highlights the role of U.S. Courts in providing a legal forum for outrageous violations of human rights 
regardless of where they are committed” in order to “to carry out obligations of the United States under 
the United Nations Charter and other international agreements pertaining to the protection of human 
rights establishing a civil action for recovery of damages from an individual who engages in torture or 
extrajudicial killing.” Michael Koebele, Corporate Responsibility under The Alien Tort 
Statute,Enforcement of International Law through US Torts Law, Leiden Martinus, 2009  NIJHOFF 
Publishers. P. 5. 
20 ATS, Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789), codified in 28 U.S.C. §1350 (1976). 
21 A sector of scholars speaks in this context of a jurisdiction "almost" universal, Pigrau Sole, “La 
jurisdiccion extraterritorial como via para hacer responsables a las empresas por daños al medio ambiente 
causados en el extranjero: especial referencia al ATCA”, en Esteban Perez Alonso y otros, Derecho, 
Globalización, Riesgo y Medio Ambiente, Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch, 2012, 183-217. 
22 See The United States Court of Appeals for the second Ciurcuit, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, (630 F.2d 876 
(2d Cir. 1980). In this case a Paraguayan citizen sued a former senior police of Stroessner dictatorship in 
Paraguay for acts of torture committed in Paraguay which led to the death of the son of the complainant. 
23On this issue see the concept of Forum Necessitatis in Marullo, Maria Chiara: “La lucha contra la 
impunidad: el Foro Necessitatis”, in InDret 3/2015, available in:  http://www.indret.com/pdf/1154.pdf  
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standards determining which international violation can be heard under this Act. They 
used five standards to determine what crimes can be prosecuted through the ATCA: 
1. Customary International Law-Standard. Based on this criteria, the ATCA can be 
activated in the event that there is a claim for a harm arising out of a violation of 
international law or treaties to which the United States is a party. Under this rule, each 
violation of customary international law could be considered sufficient to trigger the 
protection provided by the ATCA. 
2. Universal and Obligatory Standard. This criterion, widely used by the Courts, 
reduces the scope of the rule to only serious violations of international law.  
3. Jus Cogens Standard. This approach allows, with some exceptions, to include in the 
list of violations that can be prosecuted under the ATCA only the rules that have 
become Jus Cogens norms.  
4. An even more restrictive theory is the one proposed by Professor Modeste Sweeney 
who states that the ATCA should be activated only in cases of violations of the law of 
nations, as this concept was understood at the time this act was passed by Congress. 
5. The last criterion is known as the International Law Standard which, contrary to the 
previous two ones, would expand the scope of the rule on civil jurisdiction. Indeed, it 
provides that the ATCA could be applied in all cases of violations of individual rights 
recognized by international law. 
 
Despite the criticisms that have surrounded this Act since its inception, and the different 
interpretations of the criteria of its applicability, the history of ATCA has gone through 
different stages, some favorable, others more restrictive. We can identify four periods in 
its history24: the first one is the pre-Filartiga period, from 1789 to 1980, when this Act 
is not used, except in marginal cases, after Filartiga Federal Courts began to apply the 
ATCA more frequently; the second period is from 1980 to 2004, where the Sosa case 
was decided by the Supreme Court25, when the ATCA begins to be used in cases of 
torture, genocide or crimes against Humanity; a third phase after the Sosa case, in 
which the Supreme Court confirms the importance of ATCA, opens the debate on the 
                                                 
24 Marullo, Maria Chiara  El Alien Tort Claims Act de 1789: Su contribución en la protección de los 
derechos humanos y reparación para las víctimas. ICIP WORKING PAPERS, número 34 de mayo 2014, 
available in: http://icip.gencat.cat/web/.content/continguts/publicacions/workingpapers/2014/arxius/wp_2014_-
_03__cast_.pdf. 
25 Sosa v. Alvarez- Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). The Supreme Court decision in Sosa represents a 
breaking point with the past application of ATCA. The significance of Sosa is manifold. In fact, the Court 
clarified that the ATS is solely a jurisdictional statute and does not provide a cause of action and, at the 
same time, acknowledged that the causes of action that the ATS should recognize are judge-made. 
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criteria of the applicability of that rule in case of corporate responsibility for Human 
Rights violations and affirmed that this act provide jurisdiction over claims, but did not 
itself create any private right of action26; finally, a fourth phase, not yet completed, is 
characterized by two Supreme Court decisions in the Kiobel case, where there is a 
restrictive stance of the Supreme Court concerning the possibility of applying the 
ATCA to criminal behaviors committed by multinational companies abroad, and in the 
Daimler case, where the Court expressed the requirement that foreign corporations must 
be “essentially at home”, in other words, Federal Courts need to find the existence of 
more jurisdictional contacts to render those corporations “at home”, in the forum State. 
We are currently in the last stage, not completed until the Supreme Court does not 
intervene to dictate a “life or death” sentence on the ATCA, in future cases post Kiobel 
and Daimler27. It is extremely interesting, because those cases are considered by 
specialists as F- Cubed cases28 in which, due to the implication of the economic 
interests of the U.S. in protecting multinational companies, the Supreme Court decided 
that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to the ATCA and created the test 
“touch and concern” in order to limit extraterritorial cases that do not have a real 
connection with the US territory. On the basis of these two cases, it has to be noted that 
                                                 
26 On this point see v.gr.: Zamora Cabot, Francisco Javier,“Casos recientes de aplicación del Alien Tort 
Claims, supra note 18. Childress, D.E., “The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wawe of 
International Law Litigation”, Pepperdine U. School of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper 
Number 2011/9, April 2011 and  CH. Keitner, “Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Corp., Another Round in the Fight 
Over Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute”, ASIL Insight, vol. 14, Issue 30, September 30, 
2010. M. Requejo, Kenneth Anderson on Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum. in http: //conflictoflaws. 
net/2010/kenneth-anderson-on-kiovel -v- royal- dutch- petroleum. “Responsabilidad Civil y Derechos 
Humanos en EEUU: ¿El Fin del ATS?”, in Indret, Julio de 2011, 38 pp. y M. Theophila, “ Moral 
Monsters Under the Bed: Holding Corporations Accountable for Violations of the Alien Tort Statute 
After Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.“, Fordham Law Review , vol. 79, pp. 2859-2908. J. M. 
Stanisz, “The Expansion of Limited Liability Protection in the Corporate Form: The Aftermath of Kiobel 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.”, Brooklin J. of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law, 2011, pp. 573- 
599; M. Fasciglione, “Corporate Responsibility for Violation of Human Rights: Some Remarks on the US 
Court of Appeals Decision in the Kiobel Case”, in http://igbusinessandhumanrights. files. Word press. 
com/ 2011/12/m-_fasciglione_corporate _respon sibility_and_kiobel_decision1.pdf. A. Walker, “The 
Hidden Flaw in Kiobel”, Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights, vol. 10, 2011, pp. 119-
145 y A. J. Bellia y B. R. Clark, “Kiobel, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and the Alien Tort Statute”, Notre 
Dame Law School, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-52. See also, CEHRD and Amnesty Int., The 
True ‘Tragedy’: Delays and Failures in Tackling Oil Spills in the Niger Delta, 2011, 50 the Memorandum 
of Amnesty International in http://www.amnesty.org/en /library/asset/ AFR44/010/2012 /en/9ad11961-
3899-4940-b374-4f8833e9918a /afr440102012en.pdf. 
27 On this point, see Francisco Javier Zamora Cabot, “Decisión del Tribunal Supremo de los Estados 
Unidos en el caso Daimler AG v. Bauman et al: Closing the Golden Door”, Papeles El Tiemplo de los 
Derechos, n. 2, 2014. http://www.tiempodelosderechos.es/docs/wp2-14.pdf. 
28 Liesbeth Enneking has explained that F-Cubed Cases o Foreign cubed nature theory has been used to 
refer to cases in which plaintiffs and defendants are foreigners and criminal behavior is performed outside 
the United States. Liesbeth Enneking, “Multinational Corporations, Human Rights Violations and a 1789 
US Statute - A Brief Exploration of the Case of Kiobel v. Shell, Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht”, 
Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2204762, p. 399. 
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we are now facing a setback in the U.S. system for the defense of Human Rights and in 
the protection and reparation for victims when multinational companies are involved in 
such internationally wrongful acts.   
Related to those cases, international attention has focused recently on two gaps that are 
normally found when this norm is applied in cases involving multinational companies, 
the first and most important one deals with the status of multinational corporations 
under International Law and the second one deals with a technical but very important 
nature: the extraterritorial effect of laws. In fact, as we have explained on different 
occasions29, the Kiobel precedent has been singled out as well by the two staged 
approach with which the Supreme Court has confronted it. Thus, after the Court agreed 
to hear the case, it was first argued on February 2012, addressing the question of 
whether multinational corporations are subject to the mandates of Public International 
Law and, therefore, to ATCA30.  
However, at the beginning of March, the Supreme Court, contrary to its habitual 
procedure, announced another hearing. The second hearing, held on 1 October 2012, 
focused on an analysis of the extraterritorial application of ATCA. It is also worth 
noting that the Supreme Court, sua sponte, raised this question, even though it was only 
addressed marginally in legal commentaries and the parties had not made special 
mention of it. This does not suggest that the Supreme Court exceeded the scope of its 
authority, since it enjoys practically limitless powers, but the manner in which the Court 
is exercising its authority in this case is certainly surprising. What is most surprising is 
the approach of the Court in a case that was originally presented on the basis of very 
different principles. ATCA and its application have suddenly been thrown into the 
murky and tempestuous ocean of the extraterritoriality of laws. For all those reasons, it 
                                                 
29 Francisco Javier Zamora Cabot, “Kiobel and the question of extraterritoriality”, in Papeles El Tiempo 
de los Derechos, n. 2/2013, available in: http://www.tiempodelosderechos.es/materiales/working-
papers.html. 
30 On this point, we attended a dramatic change of position in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
Federal whereas, against its decision in Rabi Abdullahi v. Pfizer (Docket Nos. 05-4863-cv, 05-6768-cv), 
January 2009, in the Kiobel v. Royal Dutch states that international law does not impose obligations on 
multinational companies, so that they are not accountable for their actions under the ATCA. What turns 
out to be completely on the opposite view on this subject in the international order. The decision that we 
comment is a real backwards step which fortunately has been corrected by the other Federal Circuits in 
posterior years. As stated by Grear and Burns, the Court made this reasoning: “In 2010, a majority of the 
US Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that because of the scope of liability in an ATCA suit is 
determined by customary international law and because ‘no corporation has ever been subject to any form 
of liability (whether civil or criminal) under the customary international law of human rights’, corporate 
liability ‘is not a discernable—much less universally recognized—norm of customary international law 
that we may apply pursuant to [ATCA]”. More information in Grear, Anna and Weston, Burns, “The 
Betrayal of Human Rights and the Urgency of Universal Corporate Accountability: Reflections on a Post-
Kiobel Lawscape”, Human Rights Law Review, 2015, 15, p.31, in: http://hrlr.oxfordjournals.org. 
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is important to analyze the imbroglio created by the Supreme Court in Kiobel, before 
advancing its critical consequences. 
III. The imbroglio of Kiobel 
Recently, the concept of extraterritoriality has been associated in various ways with the 
international protection of Human Rights31. For this reason, it is, for example, linked to 
efforts to make the reparation mechanisms of the UN’s Guiding Principles accessible32. 
Or, under the form of the States’ Extraterritorial Obligations (ETOS), regarding 
obligations that put pressure on the States, based on the fulfillment, most particularly, of 
what was established in the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. In both cases, the volume and quality of the technical contributions that have 
been produced are remarkable and worth taking into consideration33. In those terms, we 
mean substantive obligations that can extend the protection of Human Rights beyond 
the national territory. 
The field of extraterritoriality can be favorable for the defense of Human Rights, but on 
its own terms, without distorting it as the US Supreme Court did in the Kiobel case, 
which weakened that defense and, on the other hand, because of its decision in Daimler. 
These are both F Cubed cases, as mentioned above, that are having significant effects 
on the future of human rights litigation in the US. As explained in previous occasions, it 
is hard to believe that the Supreme Court of the US can revolutionize a system that has 
created the ATS, a jurisdictional act, thus limiting future important Human Rights 
claims, solely on the basis of those peculiar cases34.  
                                                 
31 Francisco Javier Zamora Cabot, extraterritoriality: outstanding aspects, forthcoming ISDC publications. 
32 V. gr., Jennifer Zerk, Corporate liability for gross human rights abuses, Towards a fairer and more 
effective system of domestic law remedies, A report prepared for the Office of the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, available at the web page: http://www.ohchr.org/ Documents/ 
Issues/Business/DomesticLawRemedies/StudyDomesticeLawRemedies.pdf  and Erika George and  Lisa 
Laplante Commentary on the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Right’s study on domestic law 
remedies: Corporate Liability for Gross Human Rights Abuse, available at: http://business-
humanrights.org/en/un-office-of-the-high-commissioner-for-human-rights-launches-study-consultation-
on-domestic-law-remedies-for-corporate-involvement-in-human-rights-abuses. 
33 In general, and regarding ETOS, see Jean Ziegler,   The Right to Food, in: 
http://www.righttofood.org/the-team/jean-ziegler/; Aravind Ganesh, The Right to Food and Buyer Power, 
Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=1699870 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1699870; Fons 
Coomans, “The Extraterritorial Scope of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in theWork of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, Human 
Rights Law Review, 2011, in: http://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/r26506.pdf. Fons Coomans and Menno, 
Cases and Concepts on Extraterritorial Obligations in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Maastricht Series in Human Rights, 2012, Intersentia, Ghent and Malcolm Langford Global Justice, State 
Duties The Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in International Law, 2014, 
University of Oslo. 
34 Francisco Javier Zamora Cabot, case Daimler AG v. Bauman, supra note 27. 
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In the US legal system the term extraterritoriality is used to describe the delineation of 
the reach of substantive federal statutes, as well as federal common law, which 
determine the conduct and behavior of individuals, in cases that have contacts with 
foreign countries. As we mentioned in Section II, the ATS is a jurisdictional Statute 
created to deal with cases of serious Human Rights violations, perpetrated abroad, as 
special torts. In accordance with this legal instrument, courts would have jurisdiction for 
a restricted number of conducts contemplated by treaties and international customary 
law. Furthermore, international law, through federal common law, or a state law 
designated by rules of conflict of laws, would provide the substantive content that 
would determine the outcome of the case.35  
The imbroglio consists of the actual interpretation of the concept of extraterritoriality, 
applied to the substantive and jurisdictional aspects of the ATS36. The discussion started 
in 2012, when, after a federal appeal in Kiobel I, it was affirmed that corporations could 
not be liable under international law and under the ATS, in case of Human Rights 
abuses, so the plaintiffs sought Supreme Court review37. In the same year, in an 
unexpected move, the Supreme Court called for briefing and re-argumentation on a new 
issue: “Whether and under what circumstances the Alien Tort Statute, allows courts to 
recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the 
territory of a sovereign other than the United States”. On April 2013, the U.S. Supreme 
Court issued its disappointing decision, holding that, as a general rule, the ATS does not 
provide an avenue to justice for victims who suffered Human Rights abuses outside the 
U.S. territory. Nevertheless, meanwhile, it left open the possibility that companies and 
individuals could still be liable for Human Rights abuses committed in a foreign 
country, if the case had a stronger connection to the United States. 
                                                 
35 Regarding the questions raised in this area by what is called the cause of action, and its use in the case 
by the US Supreme Court, see COLANGELO, A. J., The Alien Tort Statute, p. 1342 et seq. 
36 On this point, Professor Anthony Colangelo (Southern Methodist University) has carried out this 
analysis in a particularly brilliant manner in a recently published article entitled: “What is Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction? Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2363695 (17.12.2014). 
Also by this author, see International Law in U.S. State Courts. 
37 As stated for Judge Leval, the reasoning behind this decision is clear: International Law takes no 
position on whether civil liability should be imposed on corporations but leaves that question to each 
nation to solve. This position was followed just by the Second Circuit in the case in re Arab Bank F.3d 
WL8122895 (2d Cir. Dec.8, 2015), in which the Court held that corporations could not be held liable 
under the ATS because customary international law did not recognize the concept of corporate liability. 
As explained by Symeonides page 10: “it is no surprise that six other Circuits that have considered this 
issue took the opposite view, explicitly or implicity”. Symeonides, Simeon, “Choice of law in the 
American Courts in 2014: Twenty-Eighth Annual Surey”, in 63 AM. J. COMP. L. (2015), the American 
Society of Comparative Law, Inc.  
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In fact, the Supreme Court, in Kiobel II, decided that the principles on which the 
presumption against extraterritoriality is based, apply to the ATS. Using the precedent 
of Morrison v. National Australia Bank38, it was established that the presumption 
against extraterritoriality applies to federal statutes unless these statutes clearly indicate 
otherwise and if those statutes only contemplate the conduct or the relationship that is 
the focus of the statute and not an ancillary activity, this Court created a critical general 
rule, but, aware of its rigidity, it tried to mitigate this rule by leaving the door open for 
cases that may have a strong connection with the United States39. For this reason, the 
Supreme Court introduced a test whereby lower courts can determine if in a specific 
case brought under the ATS, it is possible to overcome the presumption against 
extraterritoriality: the touch and concern test. This test is under construction, due the 
fact that the Supreme Court did not provide an adequate framework to apply it and 
lower courts are filling its contents on a case by case basis.  
Recently, the Supreme Court has had a new opportunity to clarify the principles on 
which this canon operates, thus closing the door to all possible doctrinal and 
jurisprudential speculation of the past 3 years. However, this Court has decided not to 
enter in this matter. We are referring to the case John Doe i; v. Nestle Usa, inc40, where 
the Supreme Court decided that the lower courts must continue to work on this subject 
before entering into the subject and take a position permanently. 
Before starting the test analysis under the different District and the Circuit courts, we 
have to stress that the presumption against extraterritoriality in Morrison became a 
standard of self-restraint in the exercise of the jurisdiction of States. The aim of this rule 
                                                 
38 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010); Federal Courts are divided on this point. Some Circuit are interpreted the 
general rule in Kiobel in a restrictive way, using the focus test established in Morrison, other Circuits use 
solely the touch and concern test established in Kiobel by the Supreme Court. The focus test states that a 
cause of action falls outside the presumption against extraterritoriality only if the events or relationships 
that are the focus of congressional concern in the relevant statute occur within the United States. On this 
point, see Edward Greene and Arpan Patel, “Consequences of Morrison v NAB, securities litigation and 
beyond”, Capital Markets Law Journal, 2016, Oxford University Press and Oona Hathaway, Kiobel 
Commentary: The door remains open to “foreign squared” cases, SCOTUSBLOG, April 18th, 2013.  
39 Commenting on a recent decision of interest in this matter, see, Richman, et al. United States: So Much 
for Bright-Line Tests. See also, Pell, O. C., and Herschman, S. E., Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko.  V.gr., 
Childress, D. E., Escaping Federal Law, p. 18 et seq. 
40 John Doe i; v. Nestle Usa, inc, Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, No. 10-56739. In this case, the 
plaintiffs contended that the companies, Nestle, Archer-Daniels-Midland Co and Cargill Inc, aided and 
abetted human rights violations through their active involvement in purchasing cocoa from Ivory Coast. 
On January 2016, The Supreme Court in the case Nestle Inc. v. John Doe, U.S. Supreme Court, No. 15-
349, petition for a writ of certiorari filed, denied the petition. The High Court rejected a bid by Nestle SA, 
the world's largest food maker, and two other companies to throw out a lawsuit seeking to hold them 
liable for the use of child slaves to harvest cocoa in Ivory Coast. More information at: http://www.reuters. 
com/article/us-usa-court-nestle-idUSKCN0UP1L420160111.  
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is to prevent clashes between US laws and other laws of different countries. Normally, 
US Courts had applied this rule in order to dismiss claims where the conduct had taken 
place outside of the United State. So, why is the Morrison precedent open to 
discussion?  
The canon in Morrison is related to a specific substantive Statute, the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934, a particular Act that creates substantial rights and obligations. In 
Morrison, the analysis of the Court is limited to this specific context, does not create 
general rules applicable to other statute, and a fortiori, it cannot be applied to a 
jurisdictional statute such as the ATS41. Following the applicable principles of 
International Law, it is clear that we cannot apply a standard of self-restraint in the 
exercise of the jurisdiction to prescribe of the States, which is substantive in nature, to 
the field of jurisdiction to adjudicate.  In fact, ever since the time of the Glossators (e.g. 
Jacobo Balduino), it is necessary to distinguish between the applicable law and judicial 
jurisdiction. Therefore, if there is a reasonable link between the facts of the case and the 
tribunal and the rights of the defense are also respected, courts can hear the case without 
problems. 
In addition to this, we must understand that there is no extraterritoriality in the field of 
Human Rights. International Law creates some international obligations for States in 
case of certain International Law violations. In particular, there is a special obligation, 
generated by universal norms, treaties and jus cogens norms, and the State which is 
better placed to decide on certain issues related to the protection of Human Rights and 
to allow access to justice, must do it, especially if no other country is able to do so. 
However, in Kiobel, the US Supreme Court, in spite of all what has been said, went 
further of what could be reasonable expected and gave rise to a stringent general rule. In 
fact, the Court held that the principles on the presumption mentioned above apply 
also to the ATS because, in its analysis, it is impossible to determine the intent of the 
US Congress at the time this act was passed, in particular if there was a consensus to 
apply it extraterritorially. So the aforementioned Canon against its extraterritorial 
application comes into force. Let us now summarize how this test is reflected within the 
Kiobel ruling: 
                                                 
41 In Kiobel, Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion recognized that the presumption against the 
extraterritorial application of substantive U.S. statutes does not apply to the ATS because the ATS is a 
jurisdictional statute that applies federal common law causes of action based on the law of nations and 
U.S. treaties. 
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On these facts, all the relevant conduct took place outside the United States. 
And even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United 
States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption 
against extraterritorial application… Corporations are often present in many 
countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence 
suffices42. 
 
The Supreme Court affirmed that if enough part of the conduct occurs domestically, the 
allegation of this circumstance should be supported by a minimum of factual predicate. 
Starting with this general rule created by the Supreme Court, Federal Courts must 
examine the facts, case by case, to see if they touch and concern sufficiently the U.S. 
territory, because touch and concern with sufficient force means domestic conduct or 
conduct within the United States that violates international law. The element of conduct 
in this test, that connects the claims to the U.S. territory, is generic, and could include 
economic or financial links between the illicit behavior carried out by a corporation 
outside the United States, and the US territory. However, the Court added that 
corporations are often present in many countries and for this reason this presence alone 
is not enough to displace the presumption43 Courts need to find other connecting points. 
For this reason, the most crucial issue after Kiobel is how the presumption would apply 
to different factual elements. Otherwise said, whether the lower Courts are interpreting 
properly the connecting elements that could displace the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. 
Even those of us who only know the US legal system superficially, can guess that these 
few and generic words of the Supreme Court afford enormous leeway regarding 
interpretation, which is why this decision has spawned a strong debate amongst 
international legal scholars and with greater repercussions in the practice of US District 
and Circuit Courts. In fact, despite the short time that has gone by since Kiobel, it is 
generating a doctrinal body of case law that is very relevant to the matters that concern 
us here. Contributions like the aforementioned article by Professor Colangelo stand out, 
along with others that are also of great interest, including articles by Paul Hoffman,44 
Sarah Cleveland,45 Uta Kohl,46 Susan Simpson,47 Jennifer Green,48 etc.  
                                                 
42 133 S.Ct. 1669 (2013). 
43Agora: reflections on Kiobel Excerpts from the American Journal of International Law and AJIL 
UNBOUND. More information in:  https://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/AGORA/201401/AJIL%20Agora-
%20Reflections%20on%20Kiobel.pdf. 
44 Paul Hoffman, “The Implications of Kiobel for Corporate Accountability Litigation under the Alien 
Tort Statute”, in Lara Blecher et al, (Eds.), Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights Impacts, ABA 
Publishing, 2014. See also Paul Hoffman and Beth Stephens, “International Human Rights Cases Under 
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It seems impossible to find a common pattern in the cases heard by the lower courts, 
which are using the very same interpretative elements, on one hand, to dismiss the 
claims because they don’t overcome the presumption of extraterritoriality and, on the 
other hand, to accept them. It is totally contradictory. Based on this test, international 
law experts are trying to create this common pattern themselves. As stated by Timothy 
J. Coleman and Emily B. Holland49 
Claims have been allowed to proceed in cases where conduct was 
fundamental to an alleged law of nations violation abroad, and where the 
action “touched and concerned” the United States because it (a) occurred 
domestically; (b) was committed by a U.S. citizen residing in the United 
States and occurred, was planned, and managed to a substantial degree in 
the U.S.; (c) was directed at the United States, and where overt acts in 
furtherance of a conspiracy took place domestically, even though the 
complaint was against foreign defendants for injuring foreign plaintiffs in a 
foreign territory; (d) transpired pursuant to a contract that forged 
“extensive” and “substantial ties” to the United States, and where managers 
in the United States approved the conduct and attempted to cover it up after 
the fact; or (e) impacted a lawful, permanent U.S. resident litigant. 
 
However, as mentioned earlier, we are witnessing contradictory judgments based on 
case-by-case analysis by the Federal Courts in which we find a different interpretation 
                                                                                                                                               
State Law and In State Courts”, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 9 (2013) and Paul Hoffman, Schonbrun 
DeSimone Seplow Harris Hoffman and Harrison LLP, Carey D'Avino, Berger and Montague, P.C., 
Published on: 31 August 2012, Kiobel litigation: Human rights implications of imposing limitations on 
Alien Tort Statute will reach beyond Nigeria, say activists, Esther Kiobel, et al. v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum, et al. - Petitioners' Supplemental Reply Brief, available at: http://business-
humanrights.org/en/pdf-esther-kiobel-et-al-v-royal-dutch-petroleum-et-al-petitioners-supplemental-reply-
brief. 
45 Sarah Cleveland, “After Kiobel”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2014, 12, Oxford 
University press. 
46 Uta Kohl, “Corporate Human Rights Accountability: The Objections of Western Governments to the 
Alien Tort Statute”, 2014, 63, International and Comparative Law Quarterly. British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law. 
47 Susan Simpson, Post-Kiobel, the Lower Courts Are Only Pretending to Apply the Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality in Alien Tort Statute Cases, available at http://viewfromll2.com/2014/07/22/post-
kiobel-the-lower-courts-are-only-pretending-to-apply-the-presumption-against-extraterritoriality-in-alien-
tort-statute-cases/; The Trojan Horse in Kiobel: Royal Dutch Conflation of Prescriptive and Adjudicative 
Jurisdiction, available at http://viewfromll2.com/2012/09/30/the-trojan-horse-in-kiobel-royal-dutch-
shells-conflation-of-prescriptive-and-adjudicative-jurisdiction/ (17.12.2014) and The Presumption against 
Extraterritoriality vs The U.S.’s Jurisdiction over Invasions of its Neutral Rights: Can Chiquita and 
Balintulo Be Reconciled with the 18th Century Case Law on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?” available at 
http://viewfromll2. com/2014/08/29/ the-presumption-against-extraterritoriality-vs-the-u-s-s-jurisdiction-
over-invasions-of-its-neutral-rights-can-chiquita-and-balintulo-be-reconciled-with-the-18th-century-case-
law-on-extra ter ritori/(17.12.2014). 
48 Jennifer Green The Rule of Law at a Crossroad: Enforcing Corporate Responsibility in International 
Investment through the Alien Tort Statute, University of Pennsylvania Journal on International Law, 
2014, 35. 
49 Touching and Concerning ‘Kiobel’: Continuing Implications, http://www.freshfields.com/ uplo 
adedFiles/SiteWide/News_Room/Insgight/Freshfields_Coleman%20Holland%20NYLJ%20PDF%20Repr
int.pdf. 
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of the concept of conduct, as the activities or final result, and of the other connecting 
elements with the U.S. Territory. 
 
IV. Federal Court’s Debates about the Test 
In Kiobel, the Supreme Court established that the ATS is subject to the general 
presumption against extraterritoriality. The Supreme Court judges have found that 
neither the initial approach adopted by Congress about the ATS nor the final text of the 
act can help to overcome that presumption, and referring to the Morrison’s case: "when 
a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none". 
However, to mitigate this position, they have created a general rule to determine the 
scope of application of the ATS, in purely jurisdictional terms, which define the 
competence of federal courts: the touch and concern test that establishes the 
applicability of the ATS in cases where there is a connection between the conduct and 
the U.S. Territory.  
The Supreme Court, with this test, has decided not to close the doors to all cases based 
on the ATS but, at the same time, has not clarified the real content of the connections 
established in it, which generates great uncertainty in the lower courts, which are 
therefore not rendering homogeneous judgments regarding the elements, features and 
limits of this test. This suggests that the lack of clarification can lead to the release of 
U.S. federal courts of the obligation to hear cases involving Human Rights violations 
which took place in another Sovereign State. In fact, lower courts have been left with 
the difficult task of interpreting the controlling language in the Court’s opinion. What 
seems clear is that the ATS, as we were used to know it, no longer exists. The federal 
courts have jurisdiction in a residual way if it is established that the claim has a strong 
connection with the United States. 
ATS cases involving extraterritorial actions are pending in several Circuits, and the 
cases that lead to the application of the touch and concern test are generating 
significant precedents, including a division among the district and federal courts. Lower 
Courts, as we have said before, have engaged in fact-intensive analysis. They are used 
to proving whether the presumption against extraterritoriality has been overcome. In 
other words, under the Supreme Court’s instruction, all Federal Courts need to 
recognize if they are in front of foreign cubed cases, which prevents overcoming the 
presumption against extraterritoriality. However, to achieve this result, the courts have 
been left without a clear pattern by the High Tribunal, which makes it quite difficult to 
19 
 
discern trend lines on this issue. This test has been applied by four Circuits50 and dozens 
of District Courts51 that have disagreed on some specific and central elements about it. 
 
The factors that the courts have used to prove whether this presumption has been 
overcome are the location of the violation, intended as the final result of the conduct; 
the location of the relevant conduct, in this case the Federal Courts disagree on the 
interpretation of the activities that can be taken as relevant conduct; the links between 
the claims and the U.S. territory and, finally, some courts have had to look at different 
factors such as the nationality of the defendant or at any American interests 
(economic or diplomatic factors). In fact, some circuits, in their analysis, use some 
factors such as the nationality or citizenship of the defendants but, in some cases, they 
maintain that these elements are not enough to overcome the presumption. 
We have analyzed some relevant cases involving Federal Courts and after this analysis 
we can conclude that the Circuit Courts are divided on the applicability of the touch 
and concern test to the ATS context, and that the Courts that have adopted the 
Morrison’s focus test are more likely to rule in favor of U.S. corporations implicated in 
violations of International Law that occurred overseas. For these Courts, the defendant’s 
corporate citizenship or its presence on US soil is irrelevant for the purposes of 
determining jurisdiction under the ATS.  
 
In many of the cases heard by the Second, the Fourth, the Ninth and the Eleventh 
Circuit, it was ruled that the plaintiff did not rebut the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. Even if they achieve the same result, the dismissal of the claim, the 
assumptions and the factors taken into account by these courts do not happen to be the 
same. For this reason, the authors specialized on this Act are critical of this result and 
hope that the Supreme Court resolves the question without delay. 
The Second Circuit dismissed the claims on the basis of an analysis of the location of 
the relevant conduct and it upheld the position of the Supreme Court in Kiobel: the 
ATS does not permit claims based on illegal conduct that occurred entirely in the 
territory of another sovereign State; for this reason, using the focus test set out in 
Morrison52, this Circuit affirms that the relevant conduct has to be closely connected 
                                                 
50 See the table at page 38 
51 Ibidem. 
52 See note 38. 
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with the territory of the United States. Opposite to this view, the Ninth Circuit has 
determined not to apply the focus test in Morrison to cases of ATS litigation because in 
Kiobel the High Tribunal did not explicitly adopted this test. The Ninth Circuit bases its 
reasoning on the location of the alleged violation.  
In relation to the factual element of the conduct, we may add that the Supreme Court in 
Kiobel discussed the concepts of conduct and claims. Without firm guidelines, 
therefore, the lower courts can and do take opposite paths. Examples of this situation 
are shown in the decisions of the Fourth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals in the 
Al Shimari53 and Chiquita Brands Intl54 cases. In both cases, the defendants are 
American companies, therefore, in both cases there is an element of connection with the 
American territory, unlike in Kiobel, and they are accused of serious Human Rights 
violations; however, the way the two courts have applied the touch and concern test it 
is quite different.55 
In the first one, the Fourth Circuit permitted an ATS suit to proceed against CACI 
employees who allegedly tortured the plaintiffs in Iraq. In fact, in this case, the Court 
used an approach where it stated that claims should implicate United States territory, 
but not conduct. Furthermore, upon evaluating the circumstances of the case in greater 
detail, through an analysis of diverse factors, it deduced sufficient contacts with the 
United States to deactivate the presumption against extraterritoriality and, therefore, 
retain jurisdiction on the basis of the ATS56. The Fourt Circuit gave several reasons 
supporting its interpretation of the Test in Kiobel. As stated by Mohamed Chehab57: 
The Fourth Circuit highlighted that Kiobel “use the phrase “relevant 
conduct” to frame its touch in concern inquiry” and “broadly stated that the 
“claims”, rather than the alleged tortuous conduct, must touch and concern 
United States territory with sufficient force”. The court described this choice 
of language as “suggesting that courts must consider all the facts that give 
rise to ATS claims, including the parties’ identities and their relationship to 
the causes of action”. 
                                                 
53 Al Shimari v. Caci, No. 13-1937, US Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit (2014). For comments on the 
decision of the District Court, see, Ellen Katuska, “Al Shimari v. Caci International, Inc.: The application 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the wake of Kiobel”, South Carolina Journal of International Law & 
Business. Available at: http://scholarcommons.sc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1099&context=scjilb. 
54 Cardona   v. Chiquita, No.12-14898, US Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit (2014). 
55 See Sarah Altshuler, “United States: Alien Tort Case Developments: Fourth and Eleventh Circuits 
Apply Kiobel’s ‘Touch and Concern’ Standard”, Mondaq, 01.08. 2014.  
56 See also Sarah Altshuler., Alien Tort Development: The Second Circuit Assesses the Appropriate Focus 
of Jurisdictional Inquiries, available at http://www.csrandthelaw. com/2014/10/27/ alien-tort-case-
development-second-circuit-addresses-the-appropriate-focus-of-jurisdictional-inquiries/ (17.12.2014). 
57 Mohamed Chehab, “Finding uniformity amidst Chaos: A common approach to Kiobel’s Touch and 
Concern Standard”, University of Detroit Mercy Law Review, University of Detroit Mercy School of law, 
2016, p. 14. 
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In contrast, in Chiquita Brands, a claim based on material support given to a group that 
calls itself the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, a terrorist organization, now 
disbanded, that is connected to thousands of crimes and victims58, the Eleventh Circuit 
rejects the need to carry out a detailed analysis of the circumstances, focusing instead on 
the foreign nature of the conduct, intended as the final result, which leads to the blanket 
application of the aforementioned presumption and, therefore, to a denial of jurisdiction 
under ATS. It is also noteworthy, as Judge Martin wrote in her dissenting opinion, how 
the Court refused to consider the many components of the aforementioned conduct that 
could be associated with a myriad of decisions taken at Chiquita’s principal 
headquarters in the US, as well as the fact that, in 2007, the company admitted to 
federal authorities that it had supported the aforementioned terrorist organization, 
agreeing to pay a 25 million dollar fine for that support. 
The Eleventh Circuit has reached similar conclusions in the case Cardona v. Chiquita 
Brands International, Inc59 and in Baloco v. Drummond Company,60in which the Court 
reaffirmed a mechanical and restrictive application of the test of the Supreme Court in 
Kiobel61. 
 
V. Post-Kiobel Consequences 
1.- The future application of the ATCA ratione personae  
The Kiobel decision leaves many problems unresolved, and the Supreme Court will 
have to address, in the coming years, some aspects that could influence in a relevant 
way the future application of ATS, if something is left of this legal instrument after 
Kiobel. In fact: 
For cases after Kiobel, any claim brought under the ATS can only be 
brought in United States courts if they “touch and concern the territory of 
the United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption against 
extraterritorial application.” This requirement is arguably the most 
controversial language of the opinion. Kiobel’s holding begs the questions 
of what “touch and concern” means, and what constitutes sufficient force. 
Justice Kennedy admits the Court’s decision left “open a number of 
                                                 
58 See Francisco Javier Zamora Cabot La Responsabilidad de las Empresas Multinacionales, supra note 4. 
59 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014). 
60 767 F.3d 1229 (2014). 
61 More information in Steven Cohen, “How Chiquita Bananas Undermined The Global War on Terror”, 
Think Progress, 2014. Available in: http://thinkprogress.org/world/2014/08/02/3466915/chiquita-
colombia-ruling/. 
22 
 
significant questions” pertaining to the reach and interpretation of the Alien 
Tort Statute62. 
 
One of the issues we want to emphasize in this paper is the Post-Kiobel applicability of 
the ATS ratione personae. It is unclear whether the test should be applied in cases of 
criminal conducts perpetrated by individuals or not, and if the elements, characteristics 
and limitations of this test will be the same that are already established for multinational 
companies.  
As we saw in Section IV, lower courts disagree about the requirements needed to 
overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality and, for example, the fact whether 
the corporate citizenship of the U.S. corporations can displace it in cases where the 
claim involves conducts that took place out of the U.S. or not. Because of this, we have 
to ask if this status, the citizenship, if referred to individuals, would be enough to 
displace this presumption. The answer seems clear to us: in most of the cases, lower 
courts are applying the same standard established in Kiobel and, therefore, they are 
dismissing all cases where the conduct is verified abroad.  
In cases where the plaintiff and the defendants are foreign citizens and the alleged 
conduct is exclusively a “foreign” conduct, the Federal Courts have decided to dismiss 
the cases because, in their opinion, they are foreign cubed cases. Examples of this are 
the cases that involve individuals from different nationalities alleging violations of the 
Law of Nations verified outside the U.S. The first case that we can mention is Hua 
Chen, et al v. Honghui Shi63, in which the plaintiff alleged that they were persecuted 
and tortured on account of their adherence to the Falun Gong movement, and they sued 
under the ATS and the TVPA. In this case, the Court affirmed not to have jurisdiction 
over the defendant because the claim had no connection with the U.S. Territory. In the 
same way, the second case in which the United States District Court of Connecticut 
reaffirmed the existence of a general rule after Kiobel is Chen Gang v. Zhao Zhizhen,64 
This case, brought before that Court, can be defined as a foreign cubed case that 
involves a foreign defendant, a foreign plaintiff, and exclusively a foreign conduct. In 
fact, in this case all parties were from China and the conducts were verified in that 
Country. 
                                                 
62 Ikegbunam, Chinyere Kimberly (2015) "“Touching the Concerns” of Kiobel: Corporate Liability and 
Jurisdictional Remedies in Response to Kiobel vs. Royal Dutch Petroleum," American Indian Law 
Review: Vol. 39: Iss. 1, Article 4. Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol39/iss1/4. 
63  No. 09 Civ. 8920 (2013). 
64 04-cv-1146, 2013 WL 5313411, at *3 (D. Conn. Sept. 20, 2013). 
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The third case is Mamani, et al. v. Sánchez de Lozada / Mamani, et al. v. Sánchez 
Berzaín65, a federal lawsuit that started in 2007 against the former president of Bolivia, 
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada and against the former Minister of Defense, Carlos 
Sánchez Berzaín. The suit seeks compensatory damages under the ATS and the TVPA, 
for extrajudicial killings, crimes against Humanity, and wrongful death and for their 
roles in the massacre of unarmed civilians, including children. The case is still pending 
before the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In 2008, the Bolivian government waived 
immunity for the defendants and the U.S. Government accepted it. On November 2009, 
the District Court allowed claims for crimes against Humanity, extrajudicial killings, 
and wrongful death to move forward against the defendants. On August 29, 2011, the 
Appellate Court rejected the immunity and political question arguments, but dismissed 
the complaint for failure to state a claim under the ATS. After that, the Plaintiffs 
presented a motion to reopen the case on June 6, 2013. On May 20, 2014, Judge James 
Cohn dismissed the new claims under the Alien Tort Statute but held that the claims 
under the Torture Victim Protection Act could proceed because the claimants had 
sufficiently alleged the facts and that defendants were responsible for the killings.  
The Fourth one is Warfaa v. Ali,66 where the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of 
Somali’s Alien Tort Statute Claims against a former Colonel in the Somali National 
Army, Yusuf Ali, who served under the military dictatorship of Mohamed Siad Barre67. 
In this case, the plaintiff alleges violations of international law under the Alien Tort 
Claims Act, crimes against Humanity and war crimes, arbitrary detention, extrajudicial 
killing, and in two different claims under the Torture Victims Protection Act, it makes 
claims of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatments. Relying on Kiobel 
test of touch and concern, the District Court dismissed Warfaa’s ATS claims and the 
Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal because all of Ali’s 
alleged conduct had occurred in Somalia. However, this Court did not dismiss the two 
claims based on the TVPA. 
The fifth case is Odilla Mutaka Mwani, et al v. Usama Bin Laden and al Qaeda68, in 
which the Justices of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia were 
                                                 
65 No. 07-22459-CV-AJ, 08-21063-CV-AJ, more information in: http://www.leagle.com/ decision/ 
In%20FDCO%2020140521B29/Mamani%20v.%20Berzain  
66 Warfaa v. Ali, No. 14-1810 (4th Cir. 2016). 
67 On this case, more information in: https://www.lawfareblog.com/warfaa-v-ali-fourth-circuit-affirms-
dismissal-somalis-alien-tort-statute-claims and http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-
courts/ca4/14-1810/14-1810-2016-02-01.html . 
68 No. 99-125(2013). 
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unanimous in the result but differed on their reasoning. They held that the ATS could 
not provide jurisdiction for foreign plaintiffs seeking redress in United States courts for 
conduct that had occurred on foreign soil. 
But what happens if the Court is able to find a minimum connection between the claim 
and the U.S. Territory, in cases in which the defendant is a U.S. citizen or a permanent 
resident? This connection is the residence and citizenship. Nevertheless, relying on the 
statutory canon against the extraterritorial application of federal statutes, the Federal 
Courts are divided on this point. 
As we have shown in the above sections, in cases involving the liability of multinational 
corporations, Federal Courts indicated, in most of the cases, that this connection is 
insufficient to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality applied to claims 
brought under the ATS, if the conduct is verified outside the U.S. territory. These 
Courts based their reasoning solely on extraterritorial activities. If the conduct takes 
place entirely outside the United States, the presumption cannot be overcome by the 
residence or citizenship of the defendants. 
In cases of individual’s responsibilities, where the defendants are U.S. citizens or 
permanent residents, Federal Courts are divided. Some Tribunals affirmed their 
jurisdiction because the presumption against the extraterritorial application of the ATS 
is then overcome. In the case Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively69, brought by an 
Uganda organization against a U.S. citizen, alleging crimes against Humanity based 
upon the persecution of persons because of their sexual orientation and/or gender 
identity, the District Court of Massachusetts stated that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality was displaced because the defendant was a U.S. citizen and a U.S. 
resident, and a substantial part of his alleged wrongful conduct had occurred in the 
United States. The same result took place in Ahmed v. Magan70, where the plaintiff 
alleged torture; cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment; and arbitrary detention. The 
civil action was brought under the ATS and the TVPA. In this case, the Court held that, 
because the defendant was a permanent resident of the United States, the presumption 
against extraterritoriality set forth in Kiobel was overcome. On August 2013, the Court 
awarded Ahmed $5,000,000 in compensatory damages and $10,000,000 in punitive 
damages71. 
                                                 
69 Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304 (D. Mass. 2013). 
70 No 2:10-cv-00342 (S.D. Ohio Aug 20, 2013). 
71 About this case, more information at: http://www.cja.org/section.php?id=422.  
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Contrary to this line of reasoning, in the cases Jawad v. Gates72 and Mwangi v. Bush 73 
the Courts held, in the first one, the lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and in the second 
one, that the plaintiff had failed under the Kiobel doctrine, given that the presumption 
against extraterritoriality was not overcome, and because the conduct had occurred 
outside the United States. 
In Jaward v. Gates, the plaintiff was arrested in Kabul in December 2002 by Afghan 
security forces who abused and threatened him. Jawad was transferred to U.S. custody, 
where he was humiliated and tortured before being transferred to Guantanamo in 2003. 
However, due to the lack of evidence, on 2009 he was released and sent back to 
Afganistan. On 2014, Jawad decided to bring six claims in the District Court for the 
District of Columbia under the ATCA, in connection with the TVPA and the Federal 
Tort Claims Act. On 2015, the District Court dismissed all the claims for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. Jawad is now appealing and the oral argument is 
scheduled for April 2016. 
In Mwangi v. Bush, the plaintiff is a resident of Kentucky who in 2003 came to the 
United States and in 2008 become a naturalized citizen. He proceeded against the 
former President of the United States, George Bush, his family and the MIO University 
in Kenia and alleged violations of basic Human Rights perpetrated in 1993-1994. In this 
civil case, without entering into the merits of the case, the link between the claim and 
the tribunal exists. However, this Court based is reasoning in the location of the 
violation, a holding where the plaintiff failed under the Kiobel’s precedent to 
demonstrate that the presumption was overcome, because the conduct occurred outside 
the United States.  
2.- Implications for the TVPA 
In the coming years, the Supreme Court will also have to solve other problems. In fact, 
there are other questions following the contentious creation of this test by the Federal 
Courts. For example, what happens to the TVPA? The question is relevant in terms of 
the two norms, the ATCA and the TVPA, because they have been enacted at different 
historical moments and with different purposes, and at least in relation to the second 
one, it seems clear that the intent of the legislator was to give jurisdiction to Federal 
Courts for cases that take place abroad. Besides, it should be recalled that the Supreme 
                                                 
72 No. 14-00811. More information on this case in:  Helen Klein, “Jawad v. Gates: Former Guantanamo 
Detainee Seeks Redress Under the Alien Tort Statute”, in: https://www.lawfareblog.com/jawad-v-gates-
former-guantanamo-detainee-seeks-redress-under-alien-tort-statute. 
73 No. 5: 12-373-KKC (2013).  
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Court in Kiobel did not deal with the conditions of the applicability of the TVPA. 
However, Federal Courts, in some cases, are extending the standard created in Kiobel 
for the purposes of ATCA, also to the TVPA, with the result of getting rid of all cases 
where the conduct takes place outside the United States. 
In practice, the touch and concern test is also unsettled as regards the TVPA. As it was 
recalled by Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Kiobel, with the TVPA the Congress created a 
detailed statutory scheme to address some Human Rights abuses committed abroad, 
unlike in the case of the ATCA74. To this we can add, as stated by Chehab75 in his 
article on “finding uniformity amidst Chaos”, that there are some differences between 
the TVPA and the ATCA:  
First, while the ATS is merely a jurisdiction-conferring statute, the TVPA 
provides both jurisdiction and a cause of action for “torture” and 
“extrajudicial killing”. Second, the TVPA is also broader than the ATS in 
that it permits claims brought by both aliens and United States citizens. 
Third, the TVPA is also narrower in other respects, only permitting suit 
against persons acting under the authority or color of law. Fourth, persons 
must also be acting under the authority of color of law of a foreign nation 
[…]. Finally, the TVPA also contains provisions governing the exhaustion 
of local remedies, tolling, and a ten-year statute of limitations. 
 
In any case, we must say that it is not definitely settled that the TVPA may be applied in 
cases involving multinational companies76. The opposite opinion was followed by the 
Eastern District Court of Louisiana, in Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan77 that was the first 
TVPA case to consider corporate liability. In this case, an Indonesian tribesman brought 
suit under the ATS and the TVPA against an American-owned mining subsidiary 
operating in Indonesia, alleging Human Rights abuses that included torture and 
extrajudicial killings. That position was confirmed, obiter dicta, by the Supreme Court, 
in the case Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority78, stating that the TVPA does not apply to 
organizations, but that corporate officers could be subjected to its rules79. The Court 
                                                 
74 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
75 Mohamed Chehab, supra note: 57 p.5. 
76 As stated by Professor Andrea Bucher, the TVPA requires intervention or delegation of public 
authority position confirmed by the Supreme Court April 18, 2012 in Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority 
132 S. Ct 1702 (2012): “A la différence de l’ATS, l’action est également ouverte aux ressortissants 
américains. Elle n’est cependant possible qu’à l’encontre des auteurs de tortures ou d’exécutions 
extrajudiciaires, ceux-ci pouvant être de toute nationalité. Ces actes doivent avoir été perpétrés par ou 
sous l’ordre d’une autorité étrangère. L’auteur doit être un individu”. 
77 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999). 
78  No. 11–88 (2012). 
79 Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority et al. Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the district 
of Columbia Circuit, in http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/11-88.pdf More information about 
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based its decision on the definition of individual in the TVPA, taking a highly textual 
approach and a strictly literal interpretation of this provision:  
Before a word will be assumed to have a meaning broader than or different 
from its ordinary meaning, Congress must give some indication that it 
intended such a result. There are no such indications in the TVPA. To the 
contrary, the statutory context confirms that Congress in the Act created a 
cause of action against natural persons alone. The Act’s liability provision 
uses the word “individual” five times in the same sentence: once to refer to 
the perpetrator and four times to refer to the victim. See TVPA §2(a). Since 
only a natural person can be a victim of torture or extrajudicial killing, it is 
difficult to conclude that Congress used “individual” four times in the same 
sentence to refer to a natural person and once to refer to a natural person and 
any nonsovereign organization. In addition, the TVPA holds perpetrators 
liable for extrajudicial killing to “any person who may be a claimant in an 
action for wrongful death.” See TVPA §2(a)(2). “Persons” often has a 
broader meaning in the law than “individual,” and frequently includes non-
natural persons. Construing “individual” in the Act to encompass solely 
natural persons credits Congress’ use of disparate terms80. 
 
We can see that there are only a few cases where the Federal Courts have extended the 
application of the TVPA to cases involving Human Rights violations by corporations, 
by adopting the meaning that is given, in other Acts, to the concept of person. In fact: 
“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates 
otherwise […] the word 'Person' […] includes corporations, companies, and 
associations”81. An example of that is the Eleventh Circuit in the case of Sinaltrainal v. 
Coca-Cola82, where the Court had interpreted the word individual, included in the 
TVPA, as also applicable to companies83; the court recognized that Congress does not 
appear to have had the intent of excluding private corporations from liability under the 
TVPA. Nevertheless, this interpretation has not been free of criticisms84 and has not 
been followed by most of the federal courts85. As Martin explains: 
                                                                                                                                               
the case: http://www.csrandthelaw.com/2012/04/23/u-s-supreme-court-holds-that-the-tvpa-does-not-
apply-to-organizations-but-corporate-officers-are-still-fair-game/.  
80 See Certiorari, p.2. 
81 1 U.S. Code, Title 1, Chapter 1, § 1 - Words denoting number, gender, and so forth, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/1/1. In this way The Supreme Court of the United State, Clinton 
v. City of N.Y., 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (holding that “individual” is applicable to corporations); In re 
Goodman, 991 F.2d 613, 619 (Cal. 1993) (holding that “individual” cannot encompass corporations. 
82 578 F.3d 1252, 1263–64 (2009). 
83 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 
1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2009). 
84 On 2012 the Supreme Court in the case Bowoto v. Chevron, 10-1536, 132 SCt1968, denied Certiorari 
due the textual approach in Mohamad v. Palestian Authority. 
85 The United States District Court for the Northern District of California, United States, Bowoto v. 
Chevron Corporation, et al., --- F.3d - --, 2010 WL 3516437 (C.A. 9 (Cal.)). In that judgment the Court 
stated that: “Even assuming the TVPA permits some form of vicarious liability, the text limits such 
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Courts have relied upon case law to interpret “individual” to include 
corporations and to exclude corporations. Courts throughout American 
jurisprudence have interpreted “individual” in varying ways with respect to 
corporations. As a result, the word “individual” itself is not determinative of 
whether corporations are within the scope of the TVPA. It should, though, be 
very persuasive that the Supreme Court has held “individual” as applicable to 
corporations in other areas of the law. […]Since there is no clear “ordinary 
usage,” courts must then look to the legislative history, public policy, and other 
contexts surrounding the statute in order to interpret “individual” in a way that 
avoids unjust results. In the context of the Torture Victim Protection Act, this 
would lead courts to interpret “individual” as applicable to corporations […]. 
Interpreting the Torture Victim Protection Act any other way than to hold 
corporations liable for their actions abroad is to limit victims’ access to remedies 
and to relieve corporations of the weight of international and domestic law, and 
allows corporations to continue to cause destruction in the lives of workers an 
citizens86 . 
 
In terms of global justice, we need to evaluate if the strictly literal interpretation of the 
Supreme Court, in the cases mentioned above, is compatible with the international 
obligations ratified by the United States and what was the real and original intention of 
the US Congress for this act. As stated by Brad Emmons: 
The intertwined history of the ATS and the TVPA demonstrates the 
congressional desire that some forum or foro exist for the litigation of civil 
actions brought against any entity that engages in torture or extrajudicial 
killings. However, the ambiguities in the existing text of the TVPA have 
allowed courts to create a circuit split that threatens to eliminate any and all 
avenues for recovering damages from corporate wrongdoers. Because this 
foreclosure of remedies would be contrary to congressional purpose and 
public policy the Supreme Court should recognize that nonnatural persons 
are liable under the TVPA […]. Only then can we truly say that the United 
States is doing everything within its power to live up to its international 
obligations, provide appropriate forms of redress for the most horrendous 
abuses, and expand the rule of law and respect for human rights across the 
globe87. 
 
3.- On the creation of a Universal Jurisdiction Norm in civil matters 
Surely it is interesting to assess the impact of this test on pending trials before federal 
courts and future claims based on this type of jurisdiction. At the same time, we must 
look at the international consequences that could negatively influence the development 
                                                                                                                                               
liability to individuals, meaning in this statute, natural persons. The language of the statute thus does not 
permit corporate liability under any theory”.   
86 Martin, Emily, “Corporate Liability under the Torture Victim Protection Act”, Northern Illinois 
University Law Review, vol. 31/2010, pp. 175-209. page 209,  
87 Brad Emmon, “Tortured Language: “Individuals,” Corporate Liability, and the Torture Victim 
Protection Act”, MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW, P.710, in http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/ 2012/02/Emmons_Rev_MLR.pdf  
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of the principle of universal jurisdiction in civil matters. In fact, in recent years, the idea 
is emerging that even in civil matters there could exist a universal jurisdiction principle 
as a counterpart to the universal criminal jurisdiction principle that is based solely on 
the nature of the crime committed88.  
The reasoning behind this type of jurisdiction is found in the fact that when it comes to 
such serious crimes that offend the very concept of Humanity and in case they stay into 
oblivion by the State in which the acts were verified, it is necessary to implement 
judicial and extrajudicial instruments to compensate the harm suffered by the victims, 
although we are in situations in which the crimes are committed abroad and against 
foreigners. Furthermore, it is important to say that the exercise of the principle of 
universal jurisdiction in civil matters is still being discussed at the international level 
and that its future is uncertain because of the difficulties to implement it. There are no 
rules of international law obliging States to exercise this type of jurisdiction in cases of 
violations of Human Rights norms89. 
The Institute of International Law has taken a clear position on this matter: in its session 
of August 30, 2015, Professor Andreas Bucher, as Reporter, put forward a resolution on 
the measures that States should create to facilitate the reparation of harm resulting from 
international crimes and thus facilitate the implementation of universal jurisdiction in 
civil proceedings90. In the Report on civil universal jurisdiction for international crimes, 
Bucher has analyzed the Alien Tort Statute and its importance for the reparation of 
victims, but also recognizes that the current position of the Supreme Court in Kiobel is 
opposed to the creation of a universal jurisdiction in civil matters91. 
                                                 
88 On this point, Donovan, Donald Francis & Roberts, Anthea, “The Emerging Recognition of Universal 
Civil Jurisdiction”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 100, 2006, pp. 142-163. 
89 Antoni Pigrau Solé: «El derecho internacional no prevé expresamente ninguna forma de jurisdicción 
civil universal, ni para autorizarla ni para prohibirla», supra note 21, p. 215. 
90 More Information about the resolution of the Institute of International Law at: 
http://www.andreasbucher-law.ch/images/stories/res_iil_en_universal_civil_jurisdiction.pdf. See also the 
Course of Professor Bucher at the Hague Academy of International Law, where he explained that: 
«L’impression a pu se répandre que la Cour suprême se seraitdéfinitivement opposée à l’idée d’une 
compétence universelle en matière civile des tribunaux américains, même dans le domainesensible des 
human rights litigations. A y regarder de plus près, une telle interprétation va au-delà de l’objet de l’arrêt 
Kiobel. Certes, la Cour suprême n’a fourni aucune « pratique des Etats » ni aucune opinio juris en faveur 
d’une telle compétence en termes de droit international coutumier. Cependant, les juges ne se sont pas 
exprimés non plus dans le sens opposé, puisque l’on ne trouve pas dans leurs opinions l’avis que le droit 
international ne permettrait pas l’acceptation d’une telle compétence universelle, par principe ou au 
regard des circonstances de l’espèce. En fait, les juges ne sont tout simplement pas parvenus à ce point 
d’un raisonnement auquel on aurait pu penser, puisque leur opinion unanime était que le Congrès n’avait 
pas l’intention d’attribuer à l’ATS un champ d’application aussi étendu qu’il aurait pu comprendre le cas 
litigieux». 
91  Institut de droit international Commission I La compétence universelle civile en matière de reparation 
pour crimes internationaux Universal civil jurisdiction with regard to reparation for international crimes 
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Due to the absence of an international treaty, it is necessary to look at other sources of 
International Law, in order to justify the existence and the elements of this principle, as 
it is the case of International customary law. The creation of a customary rule is 
accompanied by a rather slow process in which all states participate, in fact the practice 
and the opinio juris of States influence the creation, existence and the conditions of 
international customary norms, as it might be the principle of universal jurisdiction. A 
praxis contrary to this process can impact heavily on the generation of international 
rules.  
If we think of the effects that praxis has, regarding the modification and creation of 
customary rules that can lead to the creation of conventional rules on a particular matter, 
it is easy to understand how the negative praxis can crystallize in a particular historical 
moment, the conviction (the opinio juris) of States on the requirements and the 
application of certain international standards. In the case of universal jurisdiction, the 
opinio juris about the need to prosecute crimes wherever they are committed and 
whatever is the nationality of the victims and the perpetrator, began to be shaken some 
years ago in criminal matters92, and now it is being endangered by state practice, such as 
that of the United States, demonstrating the unwillingness to establish a principle of 
universal jurisdiction in civil proceedings. In Kiobel, although the issue of universal 
jurisdiction itself was not addressed, the judges have established that the Congress, at 
the time of establishing the ATS, did not understand it as a mechanism of universal 
jurisdiction: 
ATS litigation has the potential to play an important role in the development 
and enforcement of customary international law. Decisions of national 
courts can constitute state practice and evidence of opinio juris, the two 
                                                                                                                                               
Rapport par Andreas Bucher, p. 17. http://www.andreasbucher-law.ch/images/stories/rapport_idi _comm 
_i_2015_final.pdf.  
92See José Ricardo Prada Solaesa , “La justicia universal, pasado, presente y futuro”, en Tiempo de Paz 
No 112, Movimiento por la Paz, el Desarme y la Libertad, Madrid, 2014, pp 19-31 . Regarding the 
Spanish controvertial reform: Rosa Ana Alija Fernández , “Crónica de una muerte anunciada: análisis de 
la Proposición de la Ley Orgánica para la reforma de la justicia universal en España”, Blog de la Revista 
Catalana de Dret Público, 05/02/2014, in http://blocs.gencat.cat/blocs/AppPHP/eapc-
rcdp/2014/02/05/cronica-de-una-muerte-anunciada-analisis-de-la-proposicion-de-ley-organica-para-la-
reforma-de-la-justicia-universal-en-espana-rosa-ana-alija;  José Elías Esteve Moltó, “La Ley Orgánica 
1/2014 de reforma de la jurisdicción universal: entre el progresivo avance de la globalización comercial y 
de la deuda y la no injerencia en los asuntos internos de China”, Anuario Español de Derecho 
Internacional, n.30, Universidad de Navarra, 2014, pp.139-201, And  “Crónica de la impunidad 
anunciada”, el país, 2014, in: http://elpais.com/autor/jose_elias_esteve_molto/a/; Antoni Pigrau Solé, 
“Cap a la supressión de la jurisdicción universal a España: un avis sobre el futur dels drets humans en un 
món que ca a perdent els principis d'humanitat”, Bloc de l'ICIP, 2014, in. 
http://blocs.gencat.cat/blocs/AppPHP/icip/.); Angel Sánchez Legido, “El fin del modelo español de 
jurisdicción universal”, Revista electrónica de estudios internacionales, 2014, No 27, in: 
http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=4738875 
31 
 
requirements of customary international law. Thus, ATS cases are 
sometimes cited to show a customary international law norm of “civil 
universal jurisdiction”—which purportedly gives nations the power to apply 
their own law (known as “prescriptive jurisdiction”) to extraterritorial 
conduct of “universal concern” such as piracy and the slave trade. […]The 
Kiobel opinions themselves thus provided no state practice or opinio juris 
evidencing a customary international law norm of universal civil 
jurisdiction, but they also did not provide evidence against such jurisdiction. 
That is, none of the justices reasoned that international law does not permit 
universal civil jurisdiction. Instead, they did not reach this question, because 
they unanimously decided that Congress did not intend for this statute to 
extend that far.93 
 
In the same way, we must also ask ourselves what would be the impact of this test on 
the proposal to establish a forum necessitatis, advanced by some States, considering the 
US experience of the ATS94, as an exceptional mechanism created to prevent the 
growing impunity that, in particular, multinational corporations seem to enjoy. Such 
forum would allow States to intervene in an actio popularis95 manner, fulfilling their 
international obligations in defense of the fundamental interests of the International 
Community and without evading the legitimate expectations of other subjects, i.e. their 
own citizens, which are generated by the ratified international treaties on Human 
Rights96. In fact, the different forms of jurisdiction over international torts, allowing 
compensation for harm sustained, would give rise to a forum necessitatis, from a civil 
perspective, in the case of international torts committed by individuals or multinational 
companies. A good example of this seemed to be, for a long time, the ATCA and the 
TVPA. 
4.- Consequences in other areas 
                                                 
93 Agora: reflections on Kiobel, see note 39, pp. 618-619.   
94 For more information about the Forum Necessitatis in international law see: Marullo, Access to Justice 
and Forum Necessitatis, supra note12.  
95 Ibidem (2015: 3): “It was Roman law which first outlined the concept of actio popularis as a public 
action in defense of public interest. By analogy, this concept has been taken and used by International 
Law for the protection of the fundamental norms of the international community whose violation 
threatens peace and international security. The International Court of Justice defined the actio popularis 
as: “the right resident in any member of a community to take legal action in vindication of a public 
interest”[ International Court of Justice, South West Africa (Liberia v. South Africa)]. Voeffray gives a 
more detailed definition of this institution through which the actio popularis is a legal action that every 
member of a community can use in order to protect fully or partially common interest6. So, if we transfer 
this concept at the international level, where the main actors are the States, the latter should be enabled to 
defend a totally or partially common interest of the International Community as a whole, such as ensuring 
access to justice to victims of gross violations of human rights and which have appropriate mechanisms”. 
96 See also Beth Stephens, supra note 8, p. 274 “ATS human rights litigation represents a modest 
opportunity for a small number of victims and survivors of gross human rights abuses to seek a modicum 
of justice. The corporate campaign against such litigation should be recognized as yet another effort by 
multinational corporations to resist efforts to level the playing field of international justice”. 
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The Kiobel presumption against extraterritoriality is having effects even outside the 
sphere of Human Rights violations, stricto sensu. In fact, we should not underestimate 
the issue of extraterritoriality as it seems to be currently used as a justification to 
dismiss cases, even where the Plaintiffs, the Defendants, or both, are U.S. Citizens and 
where the conduct, in part or in whole, was verified in the United States, but the injuries 
occurred abroad. Examples of this are the next cases: Hernandez v United States97, 
Mehal v. Higgenbotham98 and OBB Personenverkehr v. Sachs99. 
The first case involves a claim for constitutional protection for an illicit action that was 
committed outside the United States: the shooting to death of a Mexican boy100. The 
United States Border Patrol Agent Jesus Mesa, Jr. standing on the United States 
territory, allegedly shot and killed Sergio Adrian Hernandez, who was in that moment 
on Mexican territory. The incident in this case is not an isolated act. Similar cases are 
registered and are currently being analyzed by Mexican and US Courts at national level 
and by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Hernandez’s family filed eleven 
claims against the United States, the border patrol agent and the agent’s supervisors. 
The first seven claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the next two claims under the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights, the tenth claim against Agent Mesa for violating 
Hernandez’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights through the use of excessive deadly 
force, and the eleventh claim, under the Alien Tort Statute, alleging that Hernandez was 
shot in contravention of international treaties, conventions and the Laws of Nations. 
In 2014, the District Court dismissed all claims, notwithstanding the fact that the 
conduct had occurred on US territory or that the perpetrator had been a US agent. The 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal101 affirmed the judgment in favor of the United States and 
the supervisors, but reversed the judgment as regards the border patrol agent. In relation 
to the Alien Tort Statute, the Appellants affirmed that the United States had violated the 
international prohibition against extrajudicial killings. On this point, the District Court 
established that the ATS has been interpreted as a jurisdictional statute and it has not 
                                                 
97 785 F. 3d 117 (2015). 
98 804 F.3d 417 (2015). 
99 13–1067, 577 U.S (2015). 
100 See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2014 and 2015. The American 
Journal of Comparative Law  (2015) and (2016), supra note 37. 
101 757 F3d 249 (5th Cir. 2014). 
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been held to imply any waiver of sovereign immunity and for this reason it dismissed 
the case102  
In some of those claims, the District Court raised important issues concerning the 
applicability of the Fifth Amendment and the Fourth Amendment to the issue of 
extraterritorially. The Court found two elements that can contribute to extend the 
application of their protection outside the US territory: The first relevant factor is the 
citizenship and status of the claimant. The second is the nature of the sites where the 
alleged violation had occurred. In this concrete case, the Court examined the level of 
control of the United States outside the U.S. soil. Based on this analysis, the Court 
dismissed the case. Recently, the Mexican Government submitted a brief as amicus 
curiae, in support of the petition for a writ of certiorari, in which it stated that there are 
no practical or political difficulties in applying U.S. law regardless of which side of the 
border Sergio Hernández, the victim, was on.  
The second case, Mehal v. Higgenbotham, is about a U.S. citizen secretly tortured by 
FBI ¿FBI o CIA? agents in African countries. The plaintiff alleged violations of his 
rights under the Fourth Amendment, and even in this case, the District Court dismissed 
the case stating that it is dubious whether the protection under the Fourth Amendment 
could be extended extraterritoriality. The decision is clear: no civil remedies for U.S. 
citizens tortured abroad by national agents. In this case, there are specific connecting 
elements between the conducts and the forum State, as the nationality of the victim or 
that of the perpetrator, the fact that the victim is actually in the US territory and, finally, 
but not less important, the fact that in the countries where the crimes occurred, access to 
justice in conditions of fear would be most unlikely. 
We can also emphasize that such an interpretation of extraterritoriality leads to an 
inexplicable result: no civil remedies, no protection in the US territory, if the conduct 
constituting the illicit action occurred abroad. We are making reference to the OBB 
Personenverkehr v. Sachs case, in which the respondent is Carol Sachs, a U.S. citizen 
and a resident of California, who purchased in the United States a Eurail pass to travel 
in Europe. When she was in Innsbruck, Austria, she suffered traumatic personal injuries 
after falling onto the tracks of a public train station. Due to her medical and physical 
conditions, she brought the case before a US Court to determine the civil 
                                                 
102 Even assuming that to be the case, the Appellants still must show that the United States has waived 
sovereign immunity for this claim. Other courts to address this issue have held that the ATS does not 
imply any waiver of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Tobar v. United States, 639 F.3d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
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responsibilities for the injuries. She argued that the main conduct had occurred in the 
territory of the United States, when she bought a Eurail pass in an Austrian tourism 
office located in California. The respondent argued that, based on the “Act’s 
commercial activity exception”, a foreign State does not enjoy immunity when “the 
action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign 
State.” §1605(a)(2).1 
On 2011, the District Court of California concluded that Sachs’s suit did not fall within 
the Act’s commercial activity and, therefore, granted OBB’s motion to dismiss. On 
2012, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the Lower Court’s dismissal. On rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit held that 
the sale of the Eurail pass provided an element that connected the claim to the U.S. 
Territory. However, under the Supreme Court’s analysis, the most important element 
was the conduct, understanding it as the tragic final event that constituted the gravamen 
of Sachs’s suit and, due to the fact that the conduct had occurred completely abroad, in 
Austria, the place where the ticket had been purchased was not relevant103.  
We can conclude this section by using the words of Altman104: “if the United States 
makes its courts unavailable for claims against its citizens, for actions taken within a 
foreign country, the United States may be sending the other nations a message of its 
acquiescence in the alleged violations”. 
VI. Final Reflections 
Corporate responsibility for the violation of Human Rights is a subject of interest from 
multiple perspectives, both nationally and internationally, due to its important 
consequences for Humanity. At State level, we can see how this issue is being subjected 
to analysis from the legislative and judicial perspective, as regards the creation of 
judicial mechanisms to enable victims to access the courts and assert their claims. In our 
previous works we analyzed the contribution of a U.S. norm, the Alien Tort Claims Act, 
to the protection of Human Rights and to the reparation of harm for victims. Since the 
well-known case Filártiga, in 1980, the doors for the victims of these internationally 
illicit acts seemed to be opening; they have been able to file civil lawsuits against 
individuals and companies involved in such acts, before Federal Courts. The ATCA 
                                                 
103 On this point See Francisco Javier Zamora Cabot, “Acceso de las víctimas a la justicia y conductas en 
el extranjero: El Tribunal Supremo de los Estados Unidos da otra vuelta de tuerca en el caso OBB 
Personenverkehr v. Sachs, sobre inmunidad de jurisdicción” (forthcoming). 
104 Ranon Altman, Extraterritorial application of the Alien Tort Statute after Kiobel, University of Miami 
Law Review, 01/01/2016, University of Miami Law School. P. 123, pp11-146. 
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provided a forum necessitatis105 for victims of such acts and thus they have guaranteed 
access to justice for serious Human Rights violations.  
Now, with this paper, we try to focus our attention on the characteristics and 
requirements for the implementation of the ATS and on the most relevant recent cases 
considered by Federal Courts on the basis of this Act. This paper has also evaluated this 
type of jurisdiction in light of a recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, Kiobel, in 
which the Supreme Court introduced the touch and concern test, which is in fact 
already limiting and will likely restrict the future use of this norm. Therefore, it has to 
be noted that we are facing a setback in the defense of Human Rights and in the 
protection and repair of the victims. In particular, we emphasize the negative 
implications of this case law on the establishment of a customary rule concerning 
universal jurisdiction in civil matters.  
The Kiobel’s decision has also started an intense debate between the lower Courts, on 
the evidence, the characteristics and the limits of its test, in other to overcome the 
presumption against extraterritoriality. The debate about the aforementioned test has 
been born in a relatively short period of time and in the Appeal Courts. It should be 
remembered, in any case, that as a matter of fact, that the Supreme Court was skillfully 
pushed in the direction of the aforesaid presumption by the counsel for the Kiobel 
defendants, and agreed to unite two aspects of the ATS that should have remained 
differentiated, the jurisdiction to adjudicate and the jurisdiction to prescribe.106  
 
However, we think that the statutory presumption against extraterritoriality is not truly 
being applied, since the Alien Tort Statute is a jurisdictional mechanism, not a 
substantive rule. Furthermore, the lawsuits that are connected to it are based on federal 
common law, rather than on a specific legal instrument. What is being applied instead, 
according to the Supreme Court, are the principles underlying that canon,107 mainly 
the avoidance of conflicts with other nations. It makes no sense that conflicts would 
arise when it is a question of protecting the heart of jus cogens norms regarding Human 
Rights, something that should be imposed on all States. That is also why the U.S. 
Supreme Court, based on a very weak position, and because its doctrine explicitly 
                                                 
105On this point see e.g. Marullo, Maria Chiara, supra note 12. 
106 See, Simpson The Trojan Horse in Kiobel supra note 47. 
107 Kiobel case 133 S.Ct.1664 (2013). 
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neglects the victim's access to effective remedies and reparations, found itself obliged to 
adjust it allowing some exceptions through the repeatedly cited test.  
 
At some point, the US Supreme Court will have to review its doctrine. We hope that the 
Justices will do it in the manner that is most favorable to the defense of Human Rights, 
and not in the over protected interests of multinational corporations. 
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